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ABSTRACT 
Workers of oil and gas extraction industries are exposed to different safety hazards, resulting in 
fatality rates seven times greater than that of the average U.S. worker. However, oil and gas drilling 
and servicing operations are only governed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) General Industry Standards, OSHA Construction Standards, and General Duty Clauses 
of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act. Some states have their own regulations 
regarding the safety of drilling and servicing operations, but Texas, the state with the highest 
fatality and employment of oil and gas industry, does not have any state regulation. 
The objective of the study is to develop a safety management system to improve safety 
performances of Texas drilling and servicing operations based on OSHA fatal incident data, and 
the scope of the study is only for the OSHA jurisdiction area for Texas. The study was conducted 
in two parts. The objective of the first part is to understand current regulations enforced with 
respect to Texas drilling and servicing operations and determine whether current safety 
management systems in United States (Process Safety Management, and Safety and Environment 
Management Systems) can be directly extended to drilling and servicing operations in Texas. The 
second part of the study, which would be conducted if none of the current management systems 
are sufficient for extension to drilling and servicing, is to develop a different safety management 
system specifically for Texas drilling and servicing operations within the OSHA jurisdiction area. 
The study evaluated Process Safety Management and Safety and Environment Management 
Systems and found that developing a new safety management system is a better solution to reduce 
fatal injuries of Texas drilling and servicing operations, rather than extending the two safety 
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management systems. In order to develop a new safety management system, causal factors for 
incidents were identified and categorized to generate safety management elements. The safety 
management system was developed to integrate both process and personnel safety, containing nine 
management elements, which are Personal Protective Equipment, Equipment Design/Selection, 
Inspection and Maintenance, Written Procedure, Hazard Communication, Hazard Assessment, 
Work Practice, Emergency Response Planning, and Training. The safety management system 
successfully covers gaps of OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction Standards, and 
covers frequent violations of the standards. Industries can use the management system as a 
framework to establish their safety programs. 
Future work will include 1) studying effects of human factors on safety performances of drilling 
and servicing operations, and incorporating human factors into the developed safety management 
system; 2) consideration of incorporating some management elements, such as auditing, record 
keeping and incident investigations, into the developed management system; 3) developing 
metrics to evaluate whether safety programs of industries are effective to comply with the 
developed safety management system; 4) developing contractor management to provide guidelines 
for contractor and owner companies and making sure contractors and owners are on the same page 
regarding safety programs. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
API American Petroleum Institute 
ASEE American Society of Safety Engineers 
AXPC American Exploration & Production Council 
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 
BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
CFOI Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 
CSB Chemical Safety Board 
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors 
IMIS Integrated Management Information System 
IPAA Independent Petroleum Association of America 
MKOPSC Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center 
OCS Outer Continental Shelf 
OSH   Occupational Safety and Health 
OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
PSM Process Safety Management 
SEMS Safety and Environment Management Systems 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Average annual occupational fatality rate from 2003 to 2009 in oil and gas extraction industry is 
seven times higher than the rate for all U.S. workers [1]. Similar to other industries, there are some 
common safety hazards existing in oil and gas extraction industries, such as falls, struck-by and 
caught-in/ caught-between. However, oil and gas extraction industries also have some unique 
hazards including fires, explosions, high pressure equipment, confined spaces and rotating 
machine hazards, etc. [2, 3]. 
 
In order to improve safety performances of oil and gas extraction activities, American Petroleum 
Institute (API), International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), and American National 
Standards Institute/American Society of Safety Engineers (ANSI/ASSE) have published a series 
of industry practice documents regarding the safety hazards associated with oil and gas extraction 
activities. Industries are encouraged to follow the practice documents, but are not forced [2]. 
Currently, federal regulations enforced on oil and gas operations to protect worker’s safety are 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) General Industry Standards, OSHA 
Construction Standards, and General Duty Clauses of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) 
Act [4]. All aspects of oil and gas well drilling and servicing operations are governed by OSHA 
General Industry Standards, except for site preparation activities. Site preparation activities, 
including leveling the site, trenching and excavation, are covered by OSHA Construction 
Standards. Special hazards existing in workplaces, which are not addressed by either OSHA 
General Industry Standards and Construction Standards, will be covered by General Duty Clauses 
[5].  
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Besides OSHA federal regulations, some states have their own requirements on drilling and 
servicing operations. These states are California, Alaska, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming [4]. However, 
among these states, only California and Utah provide state requirements regarding occupational 
safety. Alaska, Texas, and Wyoming regulate oil and gas industry on licensing or leasing lands for 
oil and gas exploration and regulate production waste, but there is no regulation regarding 
occupational safety.   
 
According to the report of Bureau of Labor Statistics [6], from 2007 to 2011, the state with the 
highest fatal injuries in oil and gas industries is Texas, followed by Oklahoma, Louisiana, New 
Mexico, and Wyoming. The numbers of fatal injuries during the 5 years and the employment in 
2011 are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Oil and Gas Industry Fatal Injuries [6] 
State 
Number of Fatal Injuries 
2007-2011 
Employment in 2011 
Texas 199 225,496 
Oklahoma 64 49,207 
Louisiana 62 48,947 
New Mexico 27 16,310 
Wyoming 27 16,967 
 
 
The table indicates that Texas has the highest number of fatal injuries, as well as the highest 
employment in oil and gas industry. It is possible that fatality rate of Texas is similar to or lower 
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than the fatality rates of other states. However, given the high number of fatalities, improvement 
of safety performance in Texas oil and gas industries is still needed.  As the state with the highest 
employment, Texas should be expected to perform better than other states, and reduce the fatalities 
as much as possible. Currently, Texas drilling and servicing operations are only governed by 
OSHA General Industry Standards, OSHA Construction Standards, and General Duty Clauses. In 
order to improve the safety performances of Texas oil and gas drilling and servicing operations, 
there is an urgent need to evaluate whether current regulations are adequate to address safety 
hazards associated with these operations, then further study how to reduce fatalities in Texas. 
Considering the fact that Texas is a coastal state, drilling and servicing operations are conducted 
both onshore and offshore. Thus, the scope of the study is defined as drilling and servicing 
operations within the OSHA jurisdiction area for Texas. OSHA has authority onshore and on U.S. 
navigable waters. For Texas, U.S. navigable waters include inland waters, such as lakes and 
territorial sea which extends up to 9 nautical miles seaward from the coastline [7].  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
In this section, in order to evaluate whether current regulations adequately address safety hazards 
associated with drilling servicing and operations, OSHA proposed standards specifically for oil 
and gas well drilling and servicing were reviewed, along with existing management systems which 
may be extended to drilling and servicing operations. Additionally, previous studies about 
incidents in oil and gas industries were reviewed to understand their limitations. 
 
1.2.1 OSHA Proposed Standards for Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing  
In 1980’s, due to the large number of injuries and fatalities in oil and gas well drilling and servicing, 
OSHA began gathering information to determine whether OSHA General Industry Standards 
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adequately address the unique safety hazards in these industries. It was determined that the unique 
safety hazards resulted in high injury and fatality rate, showing OSHA General Industry Standards 
fail to adequately address these unique hazards. Thus in 1983, OSHA drafted a proposed standard 
(48 FR 57202) addressing the hazards associated with gas and well drilling and servicing and made 
it as a supplement to OSHA General Industry Standards [3]. The standards proposed by OSHA 
provided requirements specifically for drilling and servicing operations such as riding hoisting 
equipment, operations near overhead power lines, along with requirements for equipment such as 
derrick and blow out prevention. However, the final action of the proposed standards failed to be 
executed, and the standard was never enforced. Thus, there continues to be a lack of specific 
OSHA standard for the oil and gas drilling and servicing industries [8].  
 
1.2.2 Process Safety Management (PSM) 
Process Safety Management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals was issued by OSHA in 1992 
for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of 
hazardous chemicals. However, PSM does not cover retail facilities, oil or gas well drilling or 
servicing operations, nor normally unoccupied remote facilities [9]. Oil and gas well drilling and 
servicing operations were exempted by PSM since OSHA had begun to propose separate 
rulemaking for drilling and servicing (48 FR 57202). In 2013, in order to improve chemical facility 
safety and security, OSHA requested comments on a potential revision to PSM and identified 
seventeen candidate topics for policy changes. One of the candidate topics was to consider whether 
the PSM exemption on oil and gas well drilling and servicing operations should be removed, since 
the separate rulemaking (48 FR 57202) failed to be published as a final rule [10]. 
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OSHA has requested comments about whether the PSM exemption on drilling and servicing 
operations should be removed. Several organizations submitted their suggestions in response to 
the request. The organizations include the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), the Mary Kay O’Connor 
Process Safety Center (MKOPSC), the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), 
as well as the American Exploration & Production Council (AXPC), and the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America (IPAA). 
 
According to the CSB response to the request for information [11], the CSB suggested PSM that 
the exemption for oil and gas well drilling and servicing operations should be eliminated and 
financial analysis of enforcing PSM is necessary to proceed. By reviewing several incidents that 
the CSB had investigated, they concluded one ubiquitous hazard associated with oil and gas well 
drilling and servicing operations is hot work activities, typically during maintenance. Since one of 
PSM elements includes hot work permitting for welding, cutting and brazing, the CSB concluded 
hazard associated with hot work activities can be controlled effectively by applying PSM on oil 
and gas drilling and servicing operations. 
 
According to the MKOPSC response [12], it was recommended to evaluate the nature of hazards 
in drilling and servicing operations before making a decision. Compared to typical process 
operations, the nature of drilling and servicing operations is different, thus implementing PSM 
may not yield any benefit. MKOPSC suggested studying process and personnel risk separately. If 
personnel risk is a major factor in such industries, other solutions can improve safety performances 
of drilling and servicing operations more effectively than implementing PSM. 
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Additionally, IADC, AXPC, and IPAA submitted their response and opposed the elimination of 
the PSM exemption for oil and gas drilling and servicing operations [13, 14]. IADC believes the 
PSM exemption does little to improve safety, but would make industries impose unnecessary 
regulatory burdens, since oil and gas well drilling operations pose negligible risk of catastrophic 
release. Similarly, AXPC and IPAA, representing natural gas and crude oil exploration and 
production companies, believe PSM is not an effective or efficient way to manage risks associated 
with oil and gas drilling and servicing operations. Instead, a separate rulemaking is recommended. 
 
Even though different organizations have different suggestions, their suggestions are lack of 
comprehensive study of incidents. Thus, according to the suggestion provided by MKOPSC, 
further analysis of incidents happened in oil and gas drilling and servicing operations is needed to 
understand hazards associated with these operations.  
 
1.2.3 Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) 
The United States has implemented a prescriptive regulatory system for offshore oil and gas 
industry for many years. After the Macondo blowout happened in 2010, the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) developed SEMS to prevent the re-occurrence of an incident 
similar to Macondo blowout and it is the regulatory agency to authorize the enforcement of SEMS 
[15]. SEMS is a goal-oriented management system designed for offshore operations to improve 
their safety performances, thus it is only enforced on Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) [15].  OCS 
means ‘all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable 
waters’ [16].  
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1.2.4 Previous Studies of Fatal Injuries Related to Drilling and Servicing Operations 
In order to draft the separate rulemaking for drilling and servicing operations (48 FR 57202), 
OSHA conducted three studies about fatal injuries related to the operations in 1980’s, based on 
reports of OSHA fatality/Catastrophe Investigations [3]. The studies were Selected Occupational 
Fatalities Related to Oil/Gas Well Drilling Rigs as Found in Reports of OSHA 
Fatality/Catastrophe Investigations, Selected Occupational Fatalities Related to Oil and Gas Well 
Drilling and Servicing as Found in Reports of OSHA Fatality/Catastrophe Investigations, and 
Comprehensive Summaries of Serious Accidents in Oil/Gas Well Industry Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC)-138 [3]. All of the three studies identified major hazards associated with 
drilling and servicing operations, and causal factors resulting in incidents. Based on the 
conclusions from these studies, OSHA proposed the separate rulemaking addressing these hazards. 
Recently, there were several studies conducted to analyze fatal incidents related to drilling and 
servicing operations [1, 17]. Based on a report by Mulloy [1], fatality rates in oil and gas extraction 
industries are correlated with the number of active rotary rigs, the number of inexperienced 
workers, and the number of working hours. Also, smaller companies tend to have higher fatality 
rates. An analysis of different types of fatalities based on the database of Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) found that, from 2003 to 2011, ‘transportation 
incidents are the most frequent, followed by contact with equipment, fires/explosions, exposure to 
harmful substances/environments, and falls’. On the other hand, Curlee et al. conducted a similar 
study based on OSHA fatality investigations from 1997 to 2003 [17]. The study concluded that 
major causes of fatalities are struck-by, followed by fires and explosions, and falls. Struck-by 
events are mainly caused by mechanical, pressure, or falling objects. Further, Curlee et al. 
analyzed incidents by equipment type, well site location, and state. 
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1.2.5 Limitations of Previous Studies 
Even though the previous studies in 1980’s revealed detailed facts about fatalities related to 
drilling servicing and operations, all conclusions of the studies were based on fatalities records 
from at least 30 years ago. During the past 30 years, operations techniques have advanced, 
knowledge of both the employee and employer have improved, and the safety culture of the 
industry has changed. Therefore, the conclusions from these studies may not be very useful for 
today’s oil and gas industries.  
 
As for recent studies, researchers have failed to distinguish between personnel with process safety 
hazards. Personnel safety hazards affect individuals but cause few effect on processing activities 
[18]. Examples of personnel safety hazards are falls, electrocutions, struck-by and caught 
in/between equipment. However, process safety hazards involve loss of containment. For example, 
fires, explosions, high-pressure shock, and unplanned release of any materials [19]. In Mulloy’s 
report, one of event types was exposure to harmful substances or environments. Exposures to both 
electricity and harmful substance are included in the event type. Exposure to electricity is 
personnel hazard, while exposure to harmful substance such as released chemicals is process 
hazard. On the other hand, according to the study of Curlee et al., struck-by event included high-
pressure shock. Stuck-by event always refers personnel safety hazard, but high-pressure shock is 
process safety hazard.  Since they failed to distinguish between personnel with process safety 
hazards, the analysis of event types in these studies could not reveal the nature of fatal incidents 
related to drilling and servicing operations.  
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1.3 Problem Statement 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are many unique hazards associated with oil and gas 
drilling and servicing operations. However, there is no specific standard enforced in oil and gas 
extraction industries. Especially in Texas, where both the employment and fatalities are the highest, 
there exists neither federal nor state regulations. Even though organizations such as API and IADC 
provide industry practices, from an industrial standpoint, complying with comprehensive practices 
is a burden. Instead, a safety management system is preferred to prevent incidents, allowing 
industries to develop safety programs based on their own safety performances. There is an urgent 
need to develop a safety management system to improve safety of Texas drilling and servicing 
operations based on real incident data. Thus, the study  
 Analyzed current safety management systems available for other industries in United 
States and determined if they could be extended to Texas drilling and servicing operations.  
 Developed a new safety management system based on incident data, if current safety 
management systems would not be appropriate for extension to Texas drilling and 
servicing operations. Since the nature of process incidents and personnel incidents are 
different, they would be studied separately, but finally the two types of the incidents would 
be integrated into a single safety management system. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The study was conducted in two parts. First, current regulations enforced on drilling and servicing 
operations would be reviewed and analyzed to determine whether current management systems in 
United States (i.e. PSM and SEMS) could be directly extended to Texas drilling and servicing 
operations. Since there are several different standards or safety management systems related to 
drilling and servicing operations, each of them is introduced here briefly. As mentioned earlier, 
current regulations enforced on drilling and servicing operations are OSHA General Industry 
Standards, OSHA Construction Standards, and General Duty Clauses of the OSH Act. Unlike 
OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction Standards, General Duty Clauses are not a 
list of standards. It only exists to record those hazards which fail to be addressed in either OSHA 
General Industry Standards or Construction Standards. On the other hand, Construction Standards 
is only applicable to site preparation, and General Industry Standards fail to address all safety 
hazards associated with drilling and servicing operations. In another words, current OSHA 
regulations are not adequate to make drilling and servicing operations safe. Thus, the study focused 
on understanding the two current management systems in United States (i.e. PSM and SEMS) to 
see whether they could be extended to Texas drilling and servicing operations. Because neither 
PSM nor SEMS currently is directly applicable for drilling and servicing for Texas, more literature 
review and data analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the scope of the two management 
systems could be broadened to Texas drilling and servicing operations within the OSHA 
jurisdiction. Since none of the current management systems can be extended, the second part of 
this project is necessary. Specifically, a different safety management system for Texas drilling and 
servicing operations was developed based on OSHA fatal incident data.   
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2.1 Data Collection 
Fatal incident data from 1992 to 2011 were collected from both OSHA inspection database and 
OSHA Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) database.  
 
OSHA is authorized to conduct workplace inspections and incident investigations, as well as cite 
employers if there is any failure to comply with OSHA standards in the workplace. OSHA covers 
most private sector employers and their workers, excluding self-employed workers, immediate 
family members of farm employers, and workplace hazards regulated by any other federal agency 
[20]. OSHA always conducts inspections without advance notices, but for some special 
circumstances, OSHA will conduct an investigation with a notice and also conduct an accident 
investigation [21].  A special circumstance, for example, could be a fatal or catastrophic incident 
(i.e. multiple injuries). 
 
All inspection data is stored in OSHA inspection database, including event date, event type, 
activity ID, injury degree, one-sentence event description, as well as violations of OSHA General 
Industry Standards and Construction Standards, and cited General Duty Clauses. The inspection 
data for fatal injuries can be directly downloaded from website. However, investigation summaries 
for fatalities and catastrophes, which are developed after the inspections, are recorded in OSHA 
IMIS database. OSHA IMIS database provides complete description of an incident, generally 
including events leading to the incident and its causal factors [22]. Thus, data was collected from 
both OSHA inspection database and OSHA IMIS database for the purpose of integrating 
inspection details and complete descriptions of incidents for further analysis. 
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OSHA inspection database covers all facilities within the OSHA jurisdiction area. The facilities 
are categorized to industry groups according to their operations and classified by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. In order to collect fatal incidents happened during drilling 
and servicing operations, only the following industries in the group of oil and gas extraction were 
covered by the study [23]: 
1) SIC 1311 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
The operations conducted by the industries include, but are not limited to exploration for 
crude petroleum and natural gas, drilling/ competing/ equipping wells, and other activities 
to prepare oil and gas up to the point of shipment from producing property. Both owner and 
contractor industries operating oil and gas wells are included. 
2) SIC 1321 Natural Gas Liquids 
The operations conducted by the industries are primarily producing liquid hydrocarbons 
from oil and gas fields. 
3) SIC 1381 Drilling Oil and Gas Wells 
The industries provide servicing for drilling wells and are only on contract basis. The 
operations include spudding in, drilling in, re-drilling, and directional drilling. 
4) SIC 1389 Oil and Gas Field Services, Not Elsewhere Classified 
The industries are primarily performing oil and gas field service on contract basis, and 
operations include excavations, cementing wells, swabbing wells and so on. 
 
As mentioned before, OSHA only has authority for onshore and U.S. navigable waters, and only 
conducts inspections and investigations within its jurisdiction. Thus, only fatal incidents happened 
in the industries listed above within the OSHA jurisdiction area were covered in the study. 
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2.2 Analysis of Fatal Incidents 
The fatal incident data is from both OSHA inspection data and OSHA IMIS database. Available 
incident information includes date, event type such as struck-by, fires, and falls, complete 
descriptions of incidents, violated General Industry Standards, violated General Construction 
Standards and General Duty Clauses. In order to extract important information of the incidents, 
following variables were coded: 
1. Process Incident/Personnel Incident 
Since the nature of process incidents and personnel incidents are different, the incidents 
were coded to either process incident or personnel incident according to incident 
descriptions. 
2. Event Type 
Incidents were coded to different types of event, such as fires, explosions, high-pressure 
shocks/releases, falls, struck-by, etc. Even though the OSHA inspection database provides 
event types of incidents, these event types cannot be divided into personnel incidents and 
process incidents. For example, high-pressure shock, which is a process incident is 
reported in the OSHA database as struck-by, which is actually a personnel incident. In 
order to know subcategories of process incidents and personnel incidents, event types were 
re-coded according to incident descriptions. 
3. Causal Factors 
Causal factors of incidents were coded, in order to study how the fatal incidents and how 
they can be avoided. Causal factors were identified from three sources: 
 Violated OSHA General Industry Standards and OSHA Construction Standards 
 General Duty Clauses 
 Incident Descriptions 
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If causal factors of an incident can be identified from violated OSHA General Industry 
Standards and Construction Standards, it means that OSHA General Industry Standards 
and Construction Standards have successfully addressed the hazards, but the employer 
failed to follow the standards and exposed workers to the hazards. 
 
If causal factors of an incident can only be identified from General Duty Clauses or the 
incident description, it means that OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction 
Standards do not or not adequately address the hazards. Thus, the gaps of the standards 
need to be filled. 
 
2.3 Generation of Safety Management Elements 
Based on these data analysis of the coded information and literature review, neither PSM nor 
SEMS was recommended to be extended to drilling and servicing operations. Thus, more analysis 
was conducted to develop a Safety Management System. 
 
Coded causal factors were categorized to generate candidate safety management elements. In order 
to explore how deficiency of each candidate management element negatively affects safety 
performances of the drilling and servicing operations, incidents related to different candidate 
management elements were studied separately. For each candidate management element, relevant 
process and personnel incidents were studied separately first, then the findings from both process 
and personnel incidents were combined to generate an integrated safety management element and 
determine whether the candidate management element should be included in the safety 
management system.  
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
3.1 Can We Extend PSM ? 
From 1992 to 2011, there were 349 incidents and 362 fatalities related to drilling and servicing 
operations within the OSHA jurisdiction area for Texas. Since only 11 out of 349 incidents 
involved multiple fatalities, each fatality was treated as a single incident in the study. Incidents 
were grouped into process incidents and personnel incidents. Process incidents included inhalation 
of any released materials, such as sulfide hydrogen and nitrogen, as well as fires or explosions, 
and high-pressure shocks. Personnel incidents include electrocutions, falls, struck-by, caught-in or 
between equipment parts, and other few special circumstances, such as drowning. A comparison 
between process and personnel incidents and a distribution of different types of incidents are 
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The two figures show that 77.3% of incidents are personnel 
incidents, and only 22.7% are process related. There are 14 management elements in PSM and 
they are specifically designed for process safety. Based on the distribution of process and 
personnel incidents, PSM may be effective to reduce the 22.7% of incidents. But there are still 
77.3% of personnel incidents, which cannot be reduced or avoided by implementing PSM. Thus, 
to improve the overall safety performances of drilling and servicing operations, simply extending 
PSM to the operations is not the best solution to control both process and personnel incidents.  
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Figure 1. Comparison between Process and Personnel Incidents 
 
 
Figure 2. Event Type Distribution for Both Process and Personnel Incidents 
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3.2 Can We Extend SEMS? 
Besides PSM, the other safety management system existing in United States is SEMS, which is 
enforced on oil and gas facilities on OCS. There are 17 management elements in SEMS, and 13 
of them are covered by PSM [24]. One of the goals of SEMS is the prevention of process incidents 
like Macondo blowout and environmental protection. Thus, compared with personnel safety, 
process safety are more likely to be focused on by SEMS.  
 
In order to determine whether the scope of SEMS can be broadened to drilling and servicing 
facilities within the OSHA jurisdiction area for Texas, differences between the OCS facilities and 
the drilling and servicing facilities within the OSHA the jurisdiction area were studied by literature 
review. In a study by Mansfield [25], major differences between OCS facilities and the drilling 
and servicing facilities within the OSHA jurisdiction area were discussed, and the differences were 
mainly discussed from the aspect of process safety. Compared with drilling and servicing facilities 
within the OSHA jurisdiction area, OCS facilities face more risks. First, risks for OCS facilities 
come from the harsh environment. Design requirements for OCS are stricter since the structures 
are required to respond to extreme sea and wind conditions. Second, OCS facilities are sometimes 
hundreds of miles away from mainland, thus when an incident happens, it is much harder to reach 
emergency rescue response to control the consequence of the incident. Lastly, the concentration 
of flammable vapors can be higher than normal conditions because of the limited layout space of 
OCS facilities, making fires and explosions more likely to take place. The limited layout space 
also allows fires and explosions to escalate more rapidly. Mansfield’s study is likely to imply that 
risks in OCS facilities are not comparable with risks of the facilities within the OSHA jurisdiction 
area. 
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Simply extending SEMS will not be beneficial to Texas drilling and servicing operations within 
the OSHA jurisdiction area, either from the aspect of personnel safety or the aspect of process 
safety. First, similar to PSM, SEMS mainly focuses on process safety, but most incidents related 
to Texas drilling and servicing operations are personnel incidents. In order to improve the overall 
safety of drilling and servicing operations within the OSHA jurisdiction area, an integrated safety 
management system is necessary to control both process and personnel hazards. Second, SEMS is 
not suitable to prevent process incidents in Texas drilling and servicing operations within the 
OSHA jurisdiction because it is specifically designed only for OCS facilities. Based on 
Mansfield’s study, risks in OCS facilities are not likely to be comparable with risks of the drilling 
and servicing facilities within the OSHA jurisdiction area. If extended to the drilling and servicing 
facilities within the OSHA jurisdiction area to prevent process incidents, SEMS may be 
overdesigned.  
 
A better solution is to develop an integrated safety management system to address both process 
and personnel safety hazards, and provide guidelines to prevent people from exposing to the 
hazards.  
 
3.3 Development of a Safety Management System  
Since neither PSM nor SEMS is effectively extended to improve overall safety performances of 
oil and gas drilling and servicing operations within the OSHA jurisdiction area, an integrated 
safety management system needs to be developed. However, even though PSM and SEMS are not 
suitable for the operations, their formats are desirable for developing the new integrated safety 
management system. Both PSM and SEMS indicate safety management elements that need to be 
addressed to mitigate risks and there format are practical ones for facility managers and employers 
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to leverage. For this study, new safety management elements were generated by studying OSHA 
fatal incident data in order to generate a comprehensive and effective safety management system. 
The first step was to identify candidate management elements by categorizing causal factors of 
fatal incidents. Since causal factors are not directly provided in the database, they were identified 
from three sources: 1) Violated OSHA General Industry Standards and OSHA Construction 
Standards, 2) General Duty Clauses, and 3) incident descriptions. As mentioned earlier, if causal 
factors of an incident can be identified from violated OSHA General Industry Standards and 
Construction Standards, it means that OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction 
Standards adequately address the hazards, but the incident happened due to the employer’s failure 
to comply with the standards. On the other hand, if causal factors of an incident can only be 
identified from General Duty Clauses or incident description, it means that OSHA General 
Industry Standards and Construction Standards do not or not adequately address the hazards. Thus, 
by categorizing causal factors which were identified from the three sources to generate candidate 
management elements, the safety management system can be effective since the elements 
successfully cover the frequent violated OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction 
Standards, as well as the gaps of OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction Standards. 
By categorizing causal factors, candidate management elements could be generated. The following 
examples are selected from fatal incident data to show how causal factors were identified, and how 
they were categorized to be management elements. 
Example 1: An employee opened the cover of an oil storage tank to gage the amount of 
water in the tank. He was killed by hydrogen sulfide. OSHA General Industry Standards 
1910.134 a (2) was cited for the incident, which requires that a respirator should be 
provided. Thus one of the causal factors of the incident could be identified as lacking 
personal protective equipment (PPE). Additionally, according to the incident description, 
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the incident happened during the operations involving hydrogen sulfide. It could be 
prevented if there was a sufficient work practice for the operation. Thus, another causal 
factor could be identified as the deficiency in work practice. 
 
Example 2: An employee worked on the roof of a trailer and fell from the height when he 
lost balance. He did not wear personnel protective equipment to prevent his fall. No 
General Industry Standards, Construction Standards, or General Duty Clauses were cited. 
Thus, the causal factor of the incident only could be identified from the incident 
description, and was determined as lack of PPE.  
 
Example 3: An employee fell from a stabbing board, wearing a safety harness which was 
attached to a deceleration lanyard. However, the safety harness was supposed to be 
secured to an inertia reel or a tail line. No General Industry Standards, Construction 
Standards or General Duty Clauses were cited. Thus, the causal factor of the incident only 
could be identified from the incident description and was determined as improper use of 
PPE. 
The causal factors of all of the above example incidents are related to the deficiency in PPE. Thus, 
the causal factors of these incidents were categorized together, and a candidate management 
element, which is PPE, was generated. 
By identifying and categorizing causal factors of incidents, eleven candidate management 
elements were generated. They are  
(1) Personal protective equipment (PPE): representing the causal factors including improper 
use of PEE, improper design of PPE or lack of PPE. 
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(2) Equipment design/selection: representing failure to comply manufacturer’s requirements, 
improper design of equipment, and failure to select appropriate equipment for operations. 
(3) Inspection and maintenance: representing lack of routine inspection/maintenance, and 
poor quality of the routine inspection/maintenance. 
(4) Written procedure: representing lack of written procedure, failure to follow written 
procedure, lack of visual inspection prior to operation, and not clearing people from 
working areas prior to operations. 
(5) Hazard assessment: representing inadequate hazard assessment/job safety analysis, and 
lack of safety device or engineering control to prevent hazards. 
(6) Work practice: representing lack of work practice for lockout, hot work, confined spaces, 
and operations near power lines. 
(7) Training: lack of or inadequate training for employees. 
(8) Hazard communication: lack of safety instruction or warning sign, lack of signalman to 
supervise the operations, and insufficient communication between coworkers. 
(9) Emergency response planning: failures to access emergency exit and improper emergency 
rescue resulting in second-injury. 
(10) Environment: extreme weather, for example, rain, strong wind and lightening. 
(11)  Others: representing causal factors which are failed to be grouped into any other 
candidate management element.  
 
Since incident information provided by OSHA database is limited, without providing investigation 
reports for incident, causal factors for some incidents could not be identified from including 
incident descriptions, violated OSHA General Industry Standards, violated Construction 
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Standards or General Duty Clauses. Thus, the following analysis is only based on 288 incidents, 
whose causal factors are identifiable. 
 
Table 2 shows that, 72% of the candidate management elements were identified from OSHA 
General Duty Clauses and incident descriptions, and only 28% of them were identified from 
OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction Standards. This indicates that General 
Industry Standards and Construction Standards do not or inadequately address the hazards to 
prevent incidents caused by these candidate management elements. If General Industry Standards 
and Construction Standards could adequately address the hazards, it would be expected that at 
least 90% of the frequencies of candidate management elements could be identified from General 
Industry Standards and Construction Standards. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Causal Factors from Different Sources 
Sources Percentage of Causal Factors 
OSHA General Industry Standards and 
Construction Standards 
28% 
General Duty Clauses and Incident 
Descriptions 
72% 
 
 
Figure 3 lists the candidate management elements which were identified and compares those from 
violated OSHA General Industry Standards and Construction Standards (grey bars) and the 
frequencies of those which were identified from incident descriptions or General Duty Clauses 
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(orange bars). Since a single incident can be caused by multiple causal factors, sum of frequencies 
is not equal to total number of incidents.  
 
Figure 3 more specifically shows the sources for different types of causal factors. For hazard 
assessment, written procedure, inspection and maintenance, and PPE, frequencies of the elements 
identified from General Duty Clauses and incident descriptions are much higher than the 
frequencies of those elements identified from General Industry Standards and Construction 
Standards. In the best case, 50% of deficiencies in training would be identified from General Duty 
Clauses and descriptions, and the other 50% would be from General Industry Standards and 
Construction Standards. If General Industry Standards and Construction Standards could 
adequately address the hazards, it would be expected that the grey bars would be much taller than 
the orange bars, and orange bars should be much lower. Thus, based on these results, OSHA 
General Industry Standards and Construction Standards have gaps to be filled and they are not 
effective enough to prevent incidents related to drilling and servicing operations. On the other 
hand, the grey bars indicates that, even though related OSHA General Industry Standards and 
Construction Standards were in place, incidents still happened due to the failures to comply with 
the standards. This feature supports the notices that a safety management system is needed to cover 
the frequent violated OSHA standards as well as fill the gaps of the OSHA General Industry 
Standards and Construction Standards. 
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Figure 3. Frequency of Candidate Management Element Identified by Different Sources 
 
Figure 4 shows how different candidate management elements contribute to process and personnel 
incidents. Among the 288 incidents whose candidate management elements are identifiable, there 
are 68 process incidents and 220 personnel incidents. The figure shows the percentages of process 
incidents caused by different candidate management elements, as well as the percentages of 
personnel incidents caused by different candidate management elements. Since an incident can be 
caused by multiple candidate management elements, the sum of percentages for either process 
incidents or personnel incidents may not equal to 100%. 
 
Figure 4 shows that all candidate management elements, except ‘others’, have contributions to 
both personnel incidents and process incidents, thus, an integrated safety management system 
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should be developed to control both process and personnel incidents. The management elements 
are not equally related to both types of incidents. Emergency response planning, hazard 
communication, work practice, hazard assessment and environment are more important for 
controlling process incidents than controlling personnel incidents. Written procedure is almost 
equally important to control both process and personnel incidents. As for other elements, they are 
more helpful to reduce personnel incidents. 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentages of Process and Personnel Incidents Caused by Different Candidate 
Management Elements 
 
In order to develop an integrated safety management system, candidate management elements 
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incidents. Similar incidents were grouped together to summarize important aspects of each element. 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
Process Incident
Personnel Incident
26 
 
Then recommendations for each candidate management element were provided by integrating the 
studies of process and personnel incidents. 
 
3.3.1 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
Appropriate PPE is effective to protect employees when they are exposed to hazards during their 
tasks. Most common PPE existing in workplaces are safety goggles, face shields, helmets, 
respiratory devices and protective clothing. 
According to Figure 4, 16.82% of personnel incidents and 5.88% of process incidents that 
happened from 1992 to 2011 were caused by deficiency in PPE. The data is also shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in PPE 
 PPE 
Personnel Incidents 16.82% 
Process Incidents 5.88% 
 
Out of the personnel incidents, similar incidents were grouped together to be subcategories of 
incidents. Table 4 shows the subcategories and corresponding percentages. 
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Table 4. Subcategories of Deficiency in PPE of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in PPE Percentage 
Lack of PPE 48.65% 
Not tying off fall protection equipment 29.73% 
Improper use of PPE 10.81% 
Inadequate capacity of PPE 8.11% 
Poor condition of PPE 2.70% 
 
In order to explore details regarding the incidents, Figure 5 shows distribution of event types 
caused by lack of PPE. In the figure, the event type ‘others’ only includes drowning. 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Personnel Incident Event Types Related to Lack of PPE 
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As the above results shown, 48.65% of the personnel incidents occurred because no PPE was used 
during operations. Lack of PPE resulted in fatalities related to fall hazard most often, followed by 
electrocution, drowning, and struck-by. In order to reduce the fall hazard, employers need to 
provide fall protection equipment for employees and take measures to ensure employees wear their 
PPE while working on heights. Additionally, in order to reduce electrocution hazard, insulated 
gloves should be used when workers replace electrical fixtures or repair damaged circuits. 
Considering some drilling and servicing operations are carried out on state waters, employers 
should provide appropriate PPE, such as life jackets, to prevent drowning hazards and require 
employees to wear the PPE when necessary. Head protection equipment, such as helmets, is 
necessary to protect employees from being struck by fallen objects. 29.73% of personnel incidents 
were fall incidents and were caused when employees did wear PPE but did not tie off their PPE. 
The situations tended to happen especially when an employee restarted his task after a short rest 
or other interruptions.  Employers are responsible for ensuring that those employees who work on 
heights wear their PPE all the time. Measures, such as supervision and checklists, could be taken 
to remind employees to tie off their PPE.  
 
Another major group of the personnel incidents were caused by using PPE improperly, which 
accounted for 10.81% of the personnel incidents related to PPE. Employers are responsible for 
ensuring employees understand the proper way to use PPE. Some drilling and servicing operations 
may involve rotating machines. Securing lanyards at improper positions may cause the lanyards 
to be entangled in rotating machines and cause people to be caught between machines.  
 
Additionally, 8.11% of the personnel incidents happened because of inadequate capacity of PPE, 
when falling objects broke through head protections and killed employees. Considering that metal 
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and heavy equipment/assemblies can fall from heights during drilling and servicing operations, 
head protection equipment used in other industries may not effectively protect workers in oil and 
gas industries. Thus, head protection equipment for drilling and servicing operations is 
recommended to be selected or upgraded according to the conditions of the operations.  
 
Last but not least, 2.70% of the personnel incidents were electrocution since employees wore wet 
gloves during the maintenance of electrical equipment. These similar incidents could be avoided 
if the employee was able to identify whether PPE was in a reliable condition to use. Thus 
employers are responsible for ensuring that their employees are able to evaluate the reliable 
conditions of PPE. 
 
On the other hand, as for the process incidents which accounted for 9.76% of the incidents related 
to PPE, all the incidents were caused because there was lack of respiratory equipment. Employees 
were exposed to the releases of nitrogen and hydrogen sulfide. Thus, employers should provide 
respirators and make sure employees wear appropriate PPE such as respirators when there is a 
possible exposure to asphyxiation hazard. 
 
According to the results and discussions above, PPE is an important component of safety 
management system, especially for preventing personnel incidents of drilling and servicing 
operations.  
 
Regarding PPE, employers should make sure that: 
 Possible hazards existing in workplaces are recognized and appropriate PPE for workers 
is provided according to the hazards the employees may be exposed to. 
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 PPE should be provided to protect workers from, but not limited to, fall, struck-by, 
electrocution, inhalation, and drowning hazards.  
 PPE should be of safe design for drilling and servicing operations to be performed.  
 Employers need to make employees at least understand the followings by providing 
instruction manuals, checklists, or supervision. 
o when PPE is necessary to wear 
o what PPE is necessary to wear 
o whether PPE is in a reliable condition 
o proper manners to use PPE, for example, securing lanyard at a proper position and 
tying off fall protection equipment all the time 
 
3.3.2 Equipment Design/Selection 
According to Figure 4, 11.36% of personnel incidents and 8.82% of process incidents that 
happened from 1992 to 2011 were caused by improper equipment designs or equipment selections. 
The data is also shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Equipment 
Design/Selection 
 Equipment Design/Selection 
Personnel Incidents 11.36% 
Process Incidents   8.82% 
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Personnel incidents were grouped to subcategories. The subcategories and corresponding 
percentages are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Subcategories of Deficiency in Equipment Design/Selection of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Equipment Design/Selection Percentage 
Improper design of walking surfaces 26.92% 
Improper design of wiring or electrical equipment 26.92% 
Improper equipment for loading/lifting operations 15.38% 
Not complying with manufacturer's requirements 15.38% 
Miscellaneous 15.38% 
 
 
26.92% of the personnel incidents could be prevented if there were better designs of walking 
surfaces. Employees need to conduct drilling and servicing operations on derricks. In order to 
prevent or reduce falls from the derricks, walking or working surfaces should have enough 
structural integrity to support employees, and should have ample spaces for working to avoid 
accidentally hitting any equipment or machine. Floor openings should be guarded with handrails 
as required by OSHA General Industry Standards 1910.23. The set of standards was cited 
frequently according to investigation records, but could be helpful to prevent fall incidents. 
Another 26.92% of the personnel incidents were electrocution, because of deficiencies in wirings 
or electrical equipment designs. The deficiencies included the following situations: 
 Fuses protecting the circuit were rated higher than permitted circuits 
 Grounding paths were not continuous and effective 
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 Open conductors did not comply with the minimum clearances from the ground as OSHA 
required 
 Electrical equipment was not installed and used in accordance with instructions 
 A cord set did not have a grounding blade on its attachment plug 
In order to prevent the deficiencies in wirings and electrical equipment designs, employers should 
be responsible for ensuring that the designs comply with manufacturer’s requirements and relevant 
OSHA regulations, as well as, making sure installations are completed by qualified technicians.  
 
Besides, 15.38% of the personnel incidents happened because equipment did not have enough 
capacity for loading and lifting operations. These improper equipment resulted in falls of loaded 
or lifted parts and exposed employees to struck-by and caught-in/between hazards. Additionally, 
failures of complying with manufacturer’s requirements accounted for another 15.38% of the 
personnel incidents, including using parts or assemblies which did not comply with manufacturing 
specifications, and not substituting parts or assemblies with manufacturer approved replacements.  
 
Other miscellaneous incidents are related to deficiencies in equipment designs or selections, but 
are failed to be categorized to any other subcategory. The miscellaneous incidents indicate that 
 A truck should be equipped with a back-up alarm to warning surrounding employees 
 Tong safety lines and snub lines should be sufficiently short to prevent more than a one-
quarter rotation of tongs 
 The configuration of knobs should be designed properly so that operators can easily 
distinguish between different ones 
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All process incidents related to the deficiency in equipment design/selection were caused by 
improper pipe design. The incidents indicate that employers should at least ensure all pipe 
fittings/valves/unions comply with manufacturer’s specifications, and ensure pipe 
fittings/valves/unions have working pressure ratings equal to or greater than maximum anticipated 
pressures. 
 
As the above results shown, improper equipment design and improper equipment selected for 
operations can result in both personnel and process incidents. However, these incidents can be 
prevented by making improvements on equipment design/selection during the initial stage of 
operations. In order to reduce these preventable incidents, equipment design/selection should be 
one of the management elements in the safety management system. 
 
Regarding equipment design/selection, employers should be responsible for: 
 Installing equipment following manufacturer’s requirements 
 Modifying/replacing equipment with manufacturer’s approvals 
 Designing or selecting appropriate equipment to make sure the equipment has proper 
capability to handle all possible operation conditions 
 Following relevant OSHA General Industry Standards to design equipment since the 
standards provides detailed requirements, especially for the design of walking or working 
surfaces in 1910.23, and the design of wiring and electrical equipment in 1910.303, 
1910.304 and 1910.305.  
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3.3.3 Inspection and Maintenance 
According to Figure 4, 15.45% of personnel incidents and 13.24% of process incidents that 
happened from 1992 to 2011 were caused by the lack of inspection and maintenance, or poor 
quality of maintenance. The data is also shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Inspection and 
Maintenance 
 Inspection and Maintenance 
Personnel Incidents 15.45% 
Process Incidents 13.24% 
 
 
Regarding personnel incidents, Figure 6 shows the detailed subcategories of the personnel 
incidents.  
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Figure 6. Details of Personnel Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Inspection and Maintenance 
 
Figure 6 shows that 85.29% of the personnel incidents were caused by defective equipment which 
lacked inspection or maintenance. For the rest of the personnel incidents which accounted for 
14.71%, employees found that equipment was defective and performed maintenance, however, 
maintenance was in poor quality and did not repair the equipment to a safe condition. Thus 
employers should improve the maintenance quality and ensure defective equipment is removed 
from service. Regarding the equipment lacking of sufficient inspection and maintenance, top 
equipment was ropes/chains/slings, followed by derricks, hoisting apparatus such as elevators and 
travel blocks, forklifts/trailers/trucks, tongs, and cords/cables. Others represent miscellaneous 
equipment, such as defective ladders and clutches. When conducting drilling and servicing 
operations, ropes/chains/slings are important equipment for rigging up/down, hoisting heavy 
attachments and connecting counterweights. Failures of the equipment could lead to struck-by or 
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caught-in/between events. The equipment should be inspected frequently. Additionally, employers 
should inspect structural integrities of derricks to prevent or reduce incidents caused by derrick 
collapses. A derrick and its auxiliary parts should be maintained in a safe condition. Routine 
inspection and maintenance should be conducted at least for hoisting apparatus, 
forklifts/trailers/trucks, and tongs to prevent struck-by and caught-in/between incidents. Electrical 
cords and cables should be inspected to prevent electrocution. 
 
On the other hand, subcategories of process incidents caused by deficiency in inspection and 
maintenance are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Subcategories of Deficiency in Inspection and Maintenance of Process Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Inspection and Maintenance Percentage 
Failure of high pressure pipes during normal operations 77.78% 
Unqualified employees conducting maintenance 11.11% 
Lack of/Insufficient safety inspection program for vacuum  
tank trucks 
11.11% 
 
As shown in Table 8, 77.78% of the personnel incidents were caused by the failures of high 
pressure pipes during normal operations. High pressure pipes should be inspected and maintained 
to ensure the integrity of pipe threads and pipe fitting threads, and ensure nipples and valves on 
high pressure pipes are in reliable and operable conditions, without any corrosion. Additionally, 
11.11% of incidents indicate that when a high pressure pipe or a hose requires maintenance, only 
a qualified technician should be assigned for the maintenance. Otherwise, an unqualified 
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technician may be struck by a high pressure pipe because of an improper operation. Another 11.11% 
of incidents indicate that a systematic safety inspection program for vacuum tank trucks should be 
developed to avoid the explosions caused by overpressure. 
 
Regarding the drilling and servicing operations, deficiency in inspection and maintenance is one 
of major causal factors leading to fatal incidents and should be one of the safety management 
elements. The management element is similar to the Mechanical Integrity of OSHA PSM. 
However, for drilling and servicing operation, the management element is effective to prevent or 
reduce both process and personnel incidents.  
 
According to the study, employers are responsible for developing an inspection and maintenance 
program to ensure equipment is maintained in a reliable and safe condition. The program should 
at least address that: 
 Critical equipment should be inspected routinely, for example, ropes, chains, slings, 
derricks, forklifts, trailers, trucks, hoisting equipment, tongs, and pipes. 
 Employers should clarify frequencies of routine inspections. 
 Employers should maintain records of inspection and maintenance. 
 Inspection and maintenance should be conducted by qualified technicians. 
 Defective equipment which may expose an employee to injury or fatality should be 
removed from service and cannot be used until it is maintained to a safe condition. If the 
equipment is necessary for an immediate operation, occasional maintenance is acceptable, 
but employers should ensure that equipment is safe to use during the operation and 
maintain the equipment immediately after the operation. 
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3.3.4 Written Procedure 
According to Figure 4, 25.91% of personnel incidents and 26.47% of process incidents happened 
due to the deficiency in written procedure. The data is also shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Written Procedure 
 Written Procedure 
Personnel Incidents 25.91% 
Process Incidents 26.47% 
 
Regarding personnel incidents, subcategories of the incidents caused by deficiency in written 
procedure are shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Subcategories of Deficiency in Written Procedure of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Written Procedure Percentage 
Lack of/Insufficient written procedure of loading/hoisting operations 49.12% 
Lack of/Insufficient visual inspection before an operation 15.79% 
Unqualified people and unclear responsibilities 12.28% 
Lack of/Insufficient written procedure of tong operations 8.77% 
Lack of/Insufficient written procedure of oil field activities involving 
reseating/removing horse heads 
3.51% 
Miscellaneous 10.53% 
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49.12% of the personnel incidents caused since written procedure of loading/hoisting operations 
was lacking or insufficient. Based on the study of the incidents caused by the deficiency in the 
candidate management element, written procedure of these operations should be provided and at 
least address that loads and hosting attachments are safely secured and employees should be 
cleared away from the working areas. Also, critical components of hoisting equipment should be 
visually inspected before operations. 15.79% of the incidents were caused by lack of visual 
inspections before rig operations and operations near electrical equipment. Even though routine 
inspections should be conducted by employers to ensure the safe conditions of the working 
environment, employers should require employees to conduct visual inspections prior to 
operations in case there are some damages or defects that happened before the next routine 
inspection. Before any rig operation such as rigging up, rigging down or leveling a rig, employees 
should visually inspect the derrick and its auxiliary parts, and ensure the parts which easily fall 
from the derrick are secured to safe positions. Thus, written procedure of rigging up/down and 
leveling a rig should at least addresses the inspection of the derrick before the operation. Similarly, 
before conducting operations involving electrical equipment, as OSHA General Industry 
Standards 1910.334 requires, portable cord and plug connected equipment and flexible cord sets 
should be visually inspected before the use on any shift for defects and damages.  
 
Besides, 12.28% of the personnel incidents happened since employers failed to assign qualified 
people to conduct operations and failed to clarify employees’ responsibilities. The incidents were 
especially likely to happen when employees were handling heavy materials; for example, when 
employees moving drilling stems/drilling rigs and loading heavy equipment on trailers. Thus, 
written procedure should be in place, assigning enough qualified employees to cooperate in 
operations, clarifying their responsibilities and providing employees safe working orders. 8.77% 
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of the incidents happened during tong operations indicate that written procedure of tong operations 
should be in place, at least addressing clearing people away from tongs. Few incidents accounting 
for 3.51% indicated that employers should provide written procedure of oil field activities 
involving reseating or removing horse heads. 10.53% of the personnel incidents could not be 
categorized to any other category, but indicate written procedures should be in place for rigging 
up doghouse, spinning chain operations, and jarring operations. 
 
Subcategories of process incidents are shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Subcategories of Deficiency in Written Procedure of Process Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Written Procedure Percentage 
Lack of/Insufficient written procedure for activities 
involving high pressure pipes or equipment 
88.89% 
Lack of/Insufficient written procedure for excavation 11.11% 
 
According to Table 11, 88.89% of the process incidents involved high pressure shocks/releases. 
In order to reduce and prevent incidents of high pressure shocks/releases, written procedure for 
operations involving high pressure equipment should be provided, at least addressing that: 
 Specifications such as maximum working pressure should be checked before operations, 
to prevent from exceeding the yield strength. 
 Inspection of high pressure equipment prior to operations should be conducted to ensure 
pressurized lines or hoses are secured safely, and ensure relief valves are in good 
conditions. 
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 Inspection of high pressure equipment should be conducted to confirm whether the 
equipment is unpressurized, if necessary. 
 People should be cleared away from the dangerous working areas. 
The rest of the process incidents were fires, accounting for 11.11%, indicating that written 
procedure for excavation is needed. Locations of utility installations should be determined during 
excavations to make sure further drillings will not hit utility lines and make gas release. 
 
Employers should provide written procedure to instruct employees to safely conduct activities 
involved in drilling and servicing operations, and take written procedure into account when 
establishing their safety programs. Employers should develop written procedures at least 
addressing: 
 Tong operations 
 Loading/hoisting operations 
 Rigging up/down and leveling a rig 
 Excavations 
 Activities involving the removing or reseating of horse heads 
 Activities involving high pressure pipelines and equipment 
 Visual inspections to be conducted prior to operations 
 Responsibility of each employee involved in activities 
 
3.3.5 Hazard Assessment 
Hazard assessment is a critical component of the safety management elements for both process 
and personnel safety. For personnel safety, it also refers to job safety analysis. Before a process or 
a task starts, hazard assessment is necessary to identify potential hazards and take preventive 
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measures to protect employees from being exposed. Preventive measures include installing safety 
devices and implementing proper engineering controls. 
 
According to Figure 4, 17.73% of personnel incidents and 27.94% of process incidents happened 
because hazard assessment was lacking or inadequate. The data is also shown in Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Hazard 
Assessment 
 Hazard Assessment 
Personnel Incidents 17.73% 
Process Incidents 27.94% 
 
Regarding personnel incidents, subcategories of the incidents are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Assessment of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Assessment Percentage 
Lack of safety devices to prevent materials from falling or rolling off 48.72% 
Inadequate Job Safety Analysis 15.38% 
Lack of/Insufficient hazard assessment to prevent electrocution 15.38% 
Lack of guarding moving parts 7.69% 
Miscellaneous 12.82% 
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48.72% of the personnel incidents were caused by lack of safety device to prevent materials from 
falling or rolling off, and 15.38% of the personnel incidents indicating there was inadequate job 
safety analysis in general. Besides, 15.38% of the incidents were caused by inadequate hazard 
assessment to prevent electrocution. Incidents caused by lacking guarding of moving parts 
surrounding pump jacks accounted for 7.69%. Struck-by hazard is one of major hazards associated 
with drilling and servicing operations. Counterweights, traveling blocks, crown blocks, and lifting 
attachments are major sources of the incidents when they are failed to be secured with proper 
safety devices and accidentally fall. Safety devices, such as anti-two blockings and safety latch 
type hooks, can be used to prevent the hazard. Additionally, tractor trailers and trucks are used 
frequently to handle tubular materials, and employees are needed to help with loading or unloading. 
Tractor trailers and trucks should be installed with pipe stops to prevent pipes from rolling off to 
strike surrounding employees. Before operations, employers are responsible for reviewing entire 
operations, identifying potential hazards, and installing proper safety devices to secure the tubular 
equipment to protect employees from struck-by hazard. Besides, employees can also be exposed 
to struck-by hazard when they work near moving parts. If there is a potential of moving parts 
striking employees, employers should safely guard the moving parts to prevent employees from 
accessing to the immediate areas when these moving parts are in operations.   
 
Another existing hazard is electrocution. Employees are exposed to electrocution hazard when 
energized equipment is not equipped with bonding or grounding, when there is no ground fault 
circuit protection, or when electrical equipment is not safely guarded. In order to ensure employees 
can be free from electrocution hazard, employers should effectively identify the hazard and take 
measures to protect employees. Last but not least, 12.82% of personnel incidents were 
miscellaneous, but the occurrences of them indicate that hazard assessment is needed to determine 
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whether it is necessary to wear PPE, whether a ladder should be installed with a safety device, 
whether a rollover protection device should be installed on a truck, and whether employees are 
protected from cave-in during excavations. These incidents did not happen frequently and could 
not be categorized to any other category, but employers should consider these cases when 
implementing hazard assessment. 
 
Regarding process incidents, subcategories of deficiency in hazard assessment are shown in Table 
14. 
 
Table 14. Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Assessment of Process Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Assessment Percentage 
Lack of/Insufficient hazard assessment for pressurized line 47.37% 
Lack of/Insufficient hazard assessment for fire/explosion hazard 26.32% 
Miscellaneous 26.32% 
 
Hazard assessment is necessary to identify fire and explosion hazard and high-pressure release 
hazard. 47.37% of the process incidents were caused by high pressure because pressurized lines 
were not secured or there was no relief valve. In order to prevent employees from deaths by 
accidental high pressure shocks and whipping hoses, employers should implement hazard 
assessment to understand the pressure release hazard. Preventive measures include securing 
pressurized hoses efficiently to avoid employees being hit, and installing appropriate relief valves 
to prevent overpressure. Combustible and flammable mixtures exist in oil and gas drilling fields. 
Fumes of the mixtures can be ignited by static electrical discharges and lightening if the mixtures 
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are improperly transferred and stored. 26.32% of process incidents were fires and explosions that 
caused by poor grounding or bonding. Bonding and grounding is necessary to prevent fires and 
explosions. Employers are responsible for assessing whether there is any fire or explosion hazard 
then install a bonding or a grounding on tanks and vacuum trucks if necessary. There were 26.32% 
of process incidents could not be categorized to any other category, but they indicate that adequate 
hazard assessment is important for safety designs, for example, not using fluorescent lights when 
there is any fire or explosion hazard, protecting valves if it is possible to be hit by kelly hose, and 
installing check valves in discharge lines from pumping equipment if necessary, and so on. 
 
According to the results and discussions above, employers are responsible for performing hazard 
assessment before exposing their employees to potential hazards. Employers should at least ensure 
that: 
 Hazard assessment is implemented before any operation or task starts. 
 Hazard assessment should be effective and comprehensive to identify all potential hazards. 
 Employees should be protected from identified hazards via effective preventive measures. 
 Effective preventive measures are not limited to installing safety devices or implementing 
engineering controls.  
o Safety devices include but are not limited to, 
 means to secure equipment to prevent falling and rolling off 
 means to secure pressurized lines to prevent whippings 
 bonding or grounding 
 safety relieve valves 
 appropriate blow-out prevention devices 
o Engineering controls include but are not limited to, 
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 guarding energized equipment to prevent contacts 
 guarding moving parts by preventing the access to the immediate area 
surrounding a pump jack 
 
3.3.6 Hazard Communication 
According to Figure 4, 10.91% of personnel incidents and 19.12% of process incidents were 
caused by deficiency in hazard communication. The data is also shown in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Hazard 
Communication 
 Hazard Communication 
Personnel Incidents 10.91% 
Process Incidents 19.12% 
 
For the personnel incidents caused by hazard communication, subcategories of the incidents are 
shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Communication of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Communication Percentage 
Insufficient communication for truck/forklift operations 33.33% 
Insufficient communication between coworkers and between 
workers in different consecutive shifts 
25.0% 
Insufficient hazard communication for electrocution hazard 20.83% 
Insufficient warning of dangerous working zones 16.67% 
Hazard communication not understandable 4.17% 
 
As shown in Table 16, 33.33% of the personnel incidents happened during truck or forklift 
operations. There were two reasons resulting in the incidents. First, there was lack of signalman 
to guide the operations. Second, signalmen were assigned to the operations, but failed to ensure 
safe conditions before they signaled, or their messages were misunderstood by operators. For truck 
and forklift operations, large loading equipment may lead to poor visibility of operators, thus 
signal men are necessary to be assigned to help with the operations. Also, it is important to make 
sure operators and signal men remain in constant communications and signaling messages are 
easily understandable.  
 
25.0% of the personnel incidents were because of insufficient communications between coworkers 
or between the workers in different consecutive working shifts. During these operations, it is 
important for coworkers to communicate efficiently, so that a worker will not be exposed to any 
hazard during tripping in, rigging up/down and/or other various operations. Electrocution 
accounted for 20.83% of the incidents and was caused since employers failed to inform employees 
about the hazard. OSHA General Industry Standards 1910.335 (b), which requires alerting 
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techniques to prevent electrocution hazards, was cited frequently. As the standard requires, 
electrocution hazards should be informed to employees and appropriate alerting techniques to limit 
employees’ accesses include using safety signs and tags, using barricades in conjunction with signs, 
and stationing attendants to warn employees. 16.67% of the incidents were caused when 
employees entered dangerous working areas, such as a loading zone, and a falling zone. Employers 
should take appropriate measures to inform the hazards associated with these working areas to 
employees, in order to avoid accidental accesses. The measures include assigning an employee to 
supervise the dangerous zones to prevent entering, and utilizing barricades or danger tags to 
indicate the hazards. 4.17% of the incidents indicate that warning postings should be 
understandable. If necessary, warnings should be delivered bilingually. 
 
Regarding process incidents caused by deficiency in hazard communication, subcategories of the 
incidents are shown in Table 17. 
 
Table 17. Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Communication of Process Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Hazard Communication Percentage 
Lack of/Insufficiently informing hazards 71.43% 
Insufficient communication between coworkers 28.57% 
 
71.43% of process incidents indicate that there was a lack of an appropriate method to inform 
about fire hazard, high-pressure hazard or lacking chemical safety information. When there is any 
identified hazard, warning system should be used to make other employees recognize the hazard. 
OSHA General Industry Standards 1910.145 and 1910.1200 were cited frequently. And as these 
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standards require, safety instruction signs and danger tags should be in place at major hazard 
situations to indicate identified hazards. Also, considering flammable materials existing in oil and 
gas industries, safety information of chemicals and relative safety measures should be provided as 
1910.1200 requires to prevent employees from being exposed to hazards. Besides, 28.57% of the 
process incidents were caused because there was a lack of communication between coworkers. 
For example, tests of blowout preventers were not informed to employees so that employees 
working near the blowout preventers were killed by high pressure shocks, or an operator fired an 
explosive charge without a positive signal from the cooperated explosives expert and an explosion 
occurred. Thus, similar to personnel incidents, communication between coworkers are important 
to prevent or reduce process incidents.  
 
According to results and discussions above, it can be found that efficient hazard communication 
is necessary to make sure employers inform potential hazards to employees and protect employees 
from the hazards. Hazard communication can be delivered by safety signs, barricades, signals, or 
communications between coworkers. Employers should develop a written hazard communication 
program, and should at least ensure that: 
 Communications between coworkers are efficient. The communications between 
coworkers are especially necessary  
o For operations involving activations of energized equipment, such as main drums 
o For rigging up or rigging down operations 
o Between the workers in different two consecutive working shifts 
 Adequate measures for hazard communication are developed to inform employees about  
o hazards associated with truck/forklift operations 
o hazards in the dangerous working areas such as falling zones and loading zones 
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o hazards of chemical materials 
o electrocution hazard 
 Hazard communication is delivered appropriately. Signal words and hazard messages are 
understandable to all employees who may be exposed to hazards. 
 OSHA General Industry Standards which are related with hazard communication should 
be followed. The standards include 1910.145 which is specifications for accident 
prevention signs and tags, 1910.335 (b) which is alerting techniques of electrical 
equipment, as well as 1910.1200 which is hazard communication of hazardous substances 
 
3.3.7 Work Practice 
According to Figure 4, 20.0% of personnel incidents and 29.41% of process incidents were caused 
by deficiency in safe work practice. The data is also shown in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Work Practice 
 Work Practice 
Personnel Incidents 20.0% 
Process Incidents 29.41% 
 
Table 19 shows that the personnel incidents could be prevented by implementing safe work 
practices for operations near overhead power lines or controlling hazardous energy sources. 
Deficiency in each of the two work practices accounted for 50.0% of the personnel incidents.  
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Table 19. Subcategories of Deficiency in Work Practice of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Work Practice Percentage 
Lack of/Insufficient work practice for operations near overhead 
power lines 
50.0% 
Lack of/Insufficient work practice for control of hazardous 
energy sources 
50.0% 
 
First, one of main causal factors of the personnel incidents was lack of or insufficient work practice 
for operations near overhead power lines. Forklift and truck operations are common for handling 
huge equipment, such as derricks and rigs, during drilling and servicing operations. When working 
near overhead power lines, the vehicles may hit power lines so that employees working on the 
vehicles can be exposed to electrocution hazard. Safe work practice for the operations near 
overhead power line is necessary, and employers should make sure that the vehicles have enough 
clearances with overhead power lines to avoid accidental contacts. Among the incidents that 
happened near overhead power lines, 72.73% of them resulted in the citations of OSHA General 
Industry Standards 1910.333, which contains minimum requirements for clearances of those 
vehicles or mechanical equipment being elevated near energized overhead power lines. When 
employers implement their safe work practice of operations near overhead power lines, the 
requirements in OSHA 1910.333 should be used as basic guidelines.  
 
Second, the other main causal factor of personnel incidents was the deficiency in controlling 
hazardous energy sources. Hazardous energy sources are the sources which can release energy to 
harm employees, including falling objects, rotating machines, accidental moving of vehicles, 
energized electrical equipment, and pumping systems. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the 
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incidents resulted in lack of/insufficient controlling hazardous energy sources by related 
equipment/ machines. 
 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of Incidents Caused by Lack of Controlling Hazardous Energy Sources by 
Equipment/Machines 
 
When employees are potentially exposed to the energy sources, lockout should be implemented to 
de-energize or isolate the energy sources. Figure 7 shows that, among the incidents caused by 
hazardous energy sources, 13.64% were caused by lacking lockout rotating machines such as 
drums. When employees conduct maintenance or servicing around rotating machines, the 
machines should be locked out efficiently to prevent employees from being caught by the 
machines. 13.64% were caused by the lack of shutting down pumps and engines. 22.73% were 
caused since employees were killed by accidental falling objects. During maintenance and 
servicing operations, the objects which can fall and release energy to kill people should be 
controlled properly. Employers should develop a lockout procedure to at least address that the 
Rotating machines
13.64%
Pumps/Engines
13.64%
Falling objects
22.73%
Vehicles
18.18%
Electrical equipment
31.82%
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objects such as hoist cables, counterweights and coil tubing units should be secured or chained 
properly prior to operations. 18.18% of the incidents caused by failures of locking vehicles so that 
employees were killed by the accidental moving of the vehicles. Employers should make sure 
employee understand hazards associated with the operations near vehicles, and ensure vehicles are 
locked out properly before their operations. The rest of incidents, which accounted for 31.82% of 
the personnel incidents, could be prevented if there was an efficient procedure for lockout of 
electrical equipment. Unlike overhead power lines, electrical equipment could be de-energized 
without affecting all electricity-driven operations. For example, an employee was involved in 
repairing a flexible power cable. Before the repairing, electricity should be de-energized to prevent 
electrocution. 
 
Table 20 shows the subcategories of the process incidents that resulted in deficiency in work 
practice with corresponding percentages. 
 
Table 20. Subcategories of Deficiency in Work Practice of Process Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Work Practice Percentage 
Lack of/Insufficient work practice for hot work 40.0% 
Lack of/Insufficient work practice for operations involving flammable 
materials 
40.0% 
Lack of/Insufficient work practice for operations involving hydrogen 
sulfide/ nitrogen 
20.0% 
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Work practices should be developed for hot work, operations involving potential exposures to 
hydrogen sulfide and nitrogen, as well as operations involving flammable materials. Table 20 
shows that, among the process incidents caused by deficiency in work practice, 40.0% of them 
were happened during hot work. Employers should develop safe work practices to at least address 
how to ensure safe conditions to conduct hot work. Only qualified employees can be assigned and 
employers should contract a third party to conduct if necessary. OSHA General Industry Standards 
1910.252 covers requirements regarding hot work such as welding, cutting and brazing, and the 
standards were cited frequently for the hot work incidents that happened during drilling and 
servicing operations. Thus when employers develop the safe work practice for hot work, OSHA 
1910.252 can be used as a guideline. Another 40.0% of process incidents were caused by the 
failure to isolate ignition sources during the operations involving any flammable material. 
Common ignition sources are pump motors and trucks. Thus, employers should develop a safe 
work practice to identify the operations involving potential releases of flammable materials, such 
as hot-oiling, drilling, and tripping pipe, and instruct employees how to make sure their operations 
are isolated with potential ignition sources. Additionally, 20.0% of the personnel incidents were 
caused by the exposures to hydrogen sulfide and nitrogen. On drilling fields, these materials exist 
in oil storage tanks and oil wells. Employers shall have safe work practice in place to protect 
employees from being exposed. 
 
According to the results and discussions above, some drilling and servicing operations, such as 
hot work, can be conducted frequently, but are associated with hazards that cause fatal incidents. 
Employers are responsible for developing work practices for these operations to improve safety 
performances. Employers should establish and implement work practices at least for following 
operations to protect employees from being exposed to the hazards.  
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 Operations near overhead power lines 
o Employers should make sure that there are enough clearances when employees 
are working around overhead power lines. Operations near overhead power lines 
include, but are not limited to, rigging up derricks and handling drilling pipes. 
 Lockout hazardous energy sources, which include but are not limited to 
o rotating machines and equipment such as drums  
o pumps and engines 
o potential falling mechanical parts such as counterweights and hoist cables 
o powerful vehicles 
o energized electrical equipment 
 Isolation of ignition sources during the operations involving flammable materials 
 Hot work 
 Operations involving potential exposures of hydrogen sulfide and nitrogen 
 
3.3.8 Training 
According to Figure 4, 17.27% of personnel incidents and 8.82% of process incidents were caused 
by deficiency in training. The data is also shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Training 
 Training 
Personnel Incidents 17.27% 
Process Incidents 8.82% 
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Table 22 shows the subcategories of the personnel incidents caused by deficiency in training. 
 
Table 22. Subcategories of Deficiency in Training of Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Training Percentage 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for truck/forklift/trailer operations 34.21% 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for operations near electrical equipment 21.05% 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for written procedure 15.79% 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for fall protection equipment 13.16% 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for hazard communication 7.89% 
Miscellaneous 7.89% 
 
34.21% of the personnel incidents were related to inadequate training of truck/forklift/trailer 
operations. Operators of the vehicles should be instructed on operations vehicles and 
loading/unloading/lifting equipment safely and only competent operators should be assigned to 
conduct the operations. Also, operators should understand safe work practice to lockout moving 
vehicles when any other employees are working around the vehicles or when the operators get 
down from vehicles to conduct any other task. 21.05% of the personnel incidents were caused by 
inadequate or lack of training about safe work practice of operations near electrical equipment. 
Thus training should be provided for the safe work practice to prevent or reduce electrocution. 
15.79% of incidents indicate that adequate training for operating procedures is necessary, and the 
operating procedures which require adequate training should at least include the procedures for 
drilling, rigging, tong operations, chain operations, and activities involving reseating/removing 
horseheads and so on.  13.16% of them were resulted in deficiency in training for fall protection 
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equipment. Employees should be trained to understand potential fall hazards and how to use PPE 
in proper manners. And 7.89% of incidents indicate that training for hazard communication is 
needed since it ensures employees can be informed about hazards efficiently. Employees should 
be trained to conduct signaling effectively, understand the hazards associated with their operations, 
and take proper measures to protect themselves from the hazards. 7.89% of miscellaneous 
incidents indicated training is necessary before an employee is assigned to a task. 
 
On the other hand, Table 23 shows the subcategories of process incidents that caused by deficiency 
in training.  
 
Table 23. Subcategories of Deficiency in Training of Process Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Training Percentage 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for hazard communication 50.0% 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for operations of high-pressure equipment 33.33% 
Lack of/ Insufficient training for truck operation 16.67% 
 
50.0% of the incidents were caused by inadequate training for hazard communication. Employees 
did not realize the chemical hazards involving their work areas and were exposed to fire/explosion 
hazard and asphyxiation hazard. Training of hazard communication is necessary to ensure 
employees understand the hazards they may be exposed to and understand measures to protect 
themselves. 33.33% of them were caused by inadequate training for the operations of high pressure 
equipment. Employees should be instructed properly to understand potential high-pressure hazards 
and follow relevant procedures to perform their tasks safely. 16.67% of the incidents was caused 
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by inadequate training of truck operations, so that a truck operator clipped the truck tire on a gas 
line, leading to an accidental gas release. 
According to results and discussions above, it can be found that training is an important component 
of the management system since employees can understand the hazards associated with their 
operations and act in safe manners via adequate trainings. Employers should establish a training 
program and ensure that: 
 Employees involved in operations are adequately trained and understand the hazards
associated with their operations. 
 Training is provided for each employee who might be exposed to hazards, and training
should be at least provided for, 
o using PPE
o safe work practice of truck/forklift/trailer operations
o safe work practice of operations near electrical equipment
o operating procedures
o hazard communication
3.3.9 Emergency Response Planning 
According to Figure 4, causal factors of 7.35% of process incidents and 1.82% of personnel 
incidents could be identified as deficiencies in emergency response planning. The data is also 
shown in Table 24. 
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Table 24. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Deficiency in Emergency 
Response Planning 
 Emergency Response Planning 
Personnel Incidents 1.82% 
Process Incidents 7.35% 
 
Considering that emergency response planning is similar for personnel incidents and process 
incidents, the discussion of the management element is not separated for process and personnel 
incidents. Deficiencies in emergency response planning include  
 improper rescue resulting in second harm to the injured employee 
 improper rescue resulting in the fatality of an additional employee who is trying to rescue  
 failures to access emergency escape routes 
 lack of qualified people to respond emergency case onsite 
Subcategories of all incidents caused by deficiency in emergency response planning is shown in 
Table 25. 
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Table 25. Subcategories of Deficiency in Emergency Response Planning of  
Process and Personnel Incidents 
Subcategories of Deficiency in Emergency Response Planning Percentage 
Failures to access emergency escape route 33.33% 
Second harm by coworkers 22.22% 
Improper rescue causing additional fatality 22.22% 
Lack of qualified people to respond emergency onsite 22.22% 
 
Table 25 shows that 33.33% of both process and personnel incidents were caused because 
employees could not access emergency escape routes. Many drilling and servicing operations are 
conducted on high derricks, thus it is hard for employees to escape during emergency cases. In 
order to make emergency response efficient, a Geronimo Emergency Escape Line should be 
installed properly, and permits fast emergency exit from working platform to safe place. 22.22% 
of the incidents were caused because of second harm by coworkers. Another 22.22% of incidents 
were caused when employees were trying to rescue their coworkers, but they were also exposed 
to the same hazards and died. These incidents indicate that all employees should be given 
instructions on emergency response, so that second harm and additional fatalities can be prevented. 
Additionally, 22.22% of incidents were caused because there was lack of qualified people to 
respond emergency case onsite. Considering drilling fields are remote and may be hard to reach 
emergency services in short time, qualified people to conduct first-aid should be onsite. Also, a 
qualified operator should be ready to stop energy sources, such as disengaging pumps, when there 
is an emergency case. 
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Based on the results and discussions above, employers should implement an emergency response 
planning program, and the program should at least address that: 
 All employees should be instructed on emergency response, to avoid a second harm and 
an additional fatality. 
 A Geronimo Emergency Escape Line should be installed properly to make sure employees 
can exit from derricks during emergency cases. 
 Qualified people to respond emergency cases should be onsite to stop energy sources. 
 Qualified first-aid people should be onsite. 
 
3.3.10 Environment 
Since drilling and servicing operations are conducted outside, environment factors such as rain, 
strong wind, and lightning can be causal factors of incidents. According to Figure 4, 1.82% of 
personnel incidents and 2.94% of process incidents were related to environmental factors. The 
data is also shown in Table 26. 
 
Table 26. Percentage of Personnel/Process Incidents Caused by Environment 
 Environment 
Personnel Incidents 1.82% 
Process Incidents 2.94% 
 
Out of the personnel incidents, 75.0% were electrocution, and 25.0% were struck-by events. 
Employees were exposed to struck-by hazard when strong wind was able to blow ropes/chains to 
strike employees. Additionally, employees were exposed to electrocution hazard when lightning 
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storms destroyed the isolation of electrical cables or boxes, and left the electrical parts in a wet 
condition. Thus, employers need to identify the potential hazards related with environmental 
factors.  These factors should be considered when employers establish safety programs. 
 
All process incidents were fire and explosions since lightening ignited fumes of flammable 
materials, which were stored in tanks or which were being transferred. Thus, employers should 
take measures to prevent the hazard, for example, by improving their inherent designs and hazard 
assessment to identify similar scenarios and isolate flammable materials from lightening, or by 
improving their training to make employees understand the hazards and avoid transferring 
flammable materials when there is a lighting storm. 
 
Environment is one of causal factors for fatal incidents, but it is not a management element. It is 
related with other management elements. When employers develop safety programs for each 
safety management element, this factor should be taken into account. 
 
3.3.11 Others 
According to Figure 4, causal factors of 9.09% of personnel incidents could not be categorized 
into any other candidate management element. Causal factors of the incidents need to be studied 
deeper to identify the underlying management issue. Based on the information provided by the 
database, it is hard to determine the categorizations of the causal factors. 
 
3.4 Limitation of the Study 
The safety management system developed from the study is a goal-oriented management system, 
which is similar to OSHA PSM and BSEE SEMS. The fatal incident data that was analyzed in the 
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study covers variable drilling and servicing operations. Details about how industries conduct these 
drilling and servicing operations require expert knowledge and cannot be known by studying the 
database only. Thus, the goal-oriented management system was developed to provide guidelines 
for industries to improve safety performances. More prescriptive safety programs are needed to be 
established by industries according to how industries conduct their operations.  
 
Some management elements that covered in OSHA PSM or BSEE SEMS, such as incident 
investigations, auditing and record keeping, are not covered in the developed safety management 
system. The reason is that the developed system are generated based on the incident database. The 
database does not reflect any deficiency of those elements. These elements are recommended to 
be considered separately and they can be incorporated into the current safety management system. 
 
Additionally, OSHA does not either provide full investigation reports of incidents to the public, 
or provide root causes of incidents in OSHA public database. Expert knowledge and judgment are 
used to identify those causal factors of incidents which are implied by incident descriptions.  Thus, 
the frequencies and percentages, which are used to describe the incidents related to the 
management elements, are with uncertainties. However, the quantitative analysis is adequate to 
reflect the safety hazards associated with drilling and servicing operations, and the safety 
management program that developed according to the analysis can be used as guidelines to help 
oil and gas industries improve their safety performances. In order to conduct a precise analysis 
about the causes of incidents in the future, OSHA investigation reports are strongly recommended 
to be accessible for researchers. 
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4. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Texas drilling and servicing operations are only governed by OSHA General Industry Standards, 
OSHA Construction Standards, and General Duty Clauses. Since General Industry Standards and 
Construction Standards do not adequately address the hazards associated with drilling and 
servicing operations, a safety management system has been developed for the operations in order 
to improve safety performances. OSHA PSM and BSEE SEMS are two safety management 
systems which may be reasonable to be extended to drilling and servicing operations within the 
OSHA jurisdiction area in Texas. However, based on the study of fatal incidents and literature 
review, extending either of the two safety management systems is not the best solution to reduce 
fatalities related to drilling and servicing operations. Instead, a safety management system has 
been developed by comprehensively studying causal factors of fatal incidents, and both process 
safety and personnel safety are integrated into the safety management system to fit the nature of 
drilling and servicing operations. The safety management system covers the frequent violated 
OSHA standards as well as fills the gaps of the OSHA General Industry Standards and 
Construction Standards. 
 
The developed safety management provides a framework to guide industries to build safety 
programs. It contains nine elements, which are PPE, Equipment Design/Selection, Inspection and 
Maintenance, Written Procedure, Hazard Assessment, Hazard Communication, Work Practice, 
Training, and Emergency Response Planning. All these elements were studied from the aspects of 
process incidents and personnel incidents, and recommendations for each management element 
were summarized. Considering environment factors such as rain, strong wind and lightning may 
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lead to fatal incidents, the environment factors should be taken into account when employers 
develop their safety programs.  
 
OSHA database does not provide root causes of fatal incidents, thus it is hard to distinguish 
whether an incident is caused by employer’s safety management issue or human factors. Besides 
effects of safety programs, employees’ performances depend on the nature of tasks, qualification 
of individuals, and safety culture of their industry. In the future, the contribution of human factors 
to safety performances of drilling and servicing operations should be studied and human factors 
are recommended to be incorporated into the developed safety management system. 
 
Some management elements covered in OSHA PSM or BSEE SEMS, such as incident 
investigations, auditing, and record keeping, are not covered in the developed management system 
since the incident database does not provide any information related to these elements. They are 
recommended to be considered separately and incorporated in the developed safety management 
system. 
 
The developed safety management system provide a guidelines for industries to set up safety 
programs. In order to evaluate whether safety programs of industries are effective to comply with 
the safety management system, metrics for the management elements should be developed in the 
future. Appropriate safety metrics can reflect the deficiencies of current safety programs and help 
industries to make improvements on their safety programs. 
 
Additionally, most drilling and servicing operations are conducted by contractors. Small contractor 
industries may not have enough abilities to develop safety programs to comply with safety 
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management systems, thus, owner industries may take the responsibilities to develop safety 
programs. In the future, there should be studies on contractor management to provide guidelines 
for contractor and owner companies, and make sure contractors and owners are on the same page 
regarding safety programs. If a contractor industry does have its own safety program complying 
with the safety management system, it is also important to ensure that there is no conflict between 
the safety programs of the contractor and its owner.  
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